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LEONARD V.B. SUTTON AWARD PAPER
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S LEGAL INTEGRATION:
A CASE STUDY OF LIVING UP TO THE DENVER
SUMMIT OF EIGHT
CHRISTINE JULIET SOHAR*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Denver, Colorado the Twenty-Third Annual Summit of the Eight
convened and hosted issues of global importance in 1997.1 The seven
leading industrial democracies plus Russia discussed international, re-
gional, and domestic steps to promote economic, political, and global
prosperity and integration and environmental reforms to foster a
healthy global ecosystem. 2 The national delegates determined:
[t]he process of globalization [is] a major factor underlying the growth
of world prosperity.... The increasing openness and interdependence
of our economies means that problems in one country can spill over
more easily to affect the rest. We must cooperate to promote global
growth and prosperity .... 3 This is a pivotal year for efforts to promote
sustainable development and protect the environment. We are deter-
mined to address the environmental challenges that will affect the
quality of life of future generations .... 4 We must all take advantage of
the possibilities for growth to address... economic insecurity [and]
sound economic policies and structural reforms necessary to allow
markets to function properly .... 5
The above statement begs the question, what has the world done to
* Joint Degree J.D. and M.B.A. Candidate, August 2000, University of Denver Col-
lege of Law; B.A. , 1996 honors and cum laude Miami University. I thank my family and
friends for their constant love, support, and encouragement. I especially thank my little
sister, Brenda and my Oma for inspiring me to follow my dreams.
1. Final Communiqu6 of the Denver Summit of the Eight, June 23, 1997 (including
the United States, England, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Japan, and Russia) [herinaf-
ter Final Communique'].
2. Id. at Introduction.
3. Id. at Economic and Social Issues 1 3-4.
4. Id. at Global Issues para. 11 & Environment 12.
5. Id. at Economic and Social Issues 1 5.
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implement the ideas of the 1997 Denver Summit of the Eight? Has any
part of the world demonstrated that the idealistic language of the
eigheen-page final communiqu6 is much more than a mere wish-list for
the world? Perhaps one of the best examples of effectuating the ideals
of the final communiqu6 of the Denver Summit of Eight is the legal de-
velopment within the European Union. The European Union continues
to modify its laws to ensure international, regional, and domestic inte-
gration and prosperity. In particular, within the civil legal system, the
European Union has found a way to use laws to harmonize multi-
national legislation in order to reach the ideal ends. The European
Union's legal reformation in the area of competition law, environmental
regulations, and monetary union poignantly demonstrate the successful
and persistent steps the European Union has taken toward the Denver
Summit's objective of promoting global harmonization. Through these
three areas of legal reform, the European Union has reached both a
broader and deeper legal harmony within the European Union, the re-
gion, and the entire world. The European Union's broad interpretation
of EU competition and environmental laws exemplify the flexibility of
existing laws, which uniformly apply to the more diverse sovereign
Member States. This broad interpretation of EU laws is especially im-
portant as additional Central and Eastern European nations transform
their laws in harmony with EU laws in hopes of joining the Union. In
comparison, however, the deepening of the European Union's legal inte-
gration demonstrates a different means to accomplish the Denver
Summit's ends. The EU deepens this legal integration through such
plans as the recent monetary union of eligible states, where the new
laws are bringing the current EU members even closer.
It is in light of these two legal movements in the EU, the broaden-
ing and deepening of integrated laws, that the European Union epito-
mizes the successful reality of the Denver Summit of Eight ideals
within its own region of the world.
II. BROADENING LEGAL INTEGRATION IN THE EU
The Diego Cali & Figli Srl v. Servici Econogici Porto di Genova SpA
decision, delivered in March, 1997, demonstrates the expansive new le-
gal concept for the European Union (EU) was well underway even be-
fore the meeting of the Denver Summit.6 In this decision, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) broadened the flexibility of Union laws by de-
claring that competition rules do not apply to the private companies
monitoring and executing the anti-pollution surveillance schemes hired
6. Case 343/95, Diego Cali & Figli Sri v. Servizi Econogici Porto di Genova SpA,
1997 E.C.R. 1-1547.
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by public authorities. 7 In general, the court held that Servici Econogici
Porto di Genova's (SEPG's) environmental protections, which are public
interest activities, do not present an economic impact warranting appli-
cation of competition laws.8
Traditionally, the ECJ narrowly considered competition and envi-
ronmental laws as distinctly separate areas of law. The Cali case, how-
ever, uniquely and broadly integrates both competition law, ensuring a
free market economy, and environmental law, preventing marine pollu-
tion.9 The ECJ analyzed whether a private limited company, estab-
lished and empowered by a national port authority, violated the compe-
tition rules of the Treaty of Rome of the European Communities (EC
Traeaty) by levying charges on behalf of Italy. 10 The Court questioned
SEPG's private business right to enforce national and regional anti-
pollution standards." However, pursuant EU competition laws, Arti-
cles 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty, the ECJ ruled that SEPG did not abuse
their dominant market power. 12 The ECJ further held that when a pri-
vate company receives its authority from the state government, the en-
vironmental protection of a public interest does not violate EU competi-
tion laws.' 3  Therefore, the preventative anti-pollution services
performed by SEPG in the oil port of Genova, as authorized by the
Italian government, were not abusive anti-competitive acts according to
EU competition law; and Cali, who violated the environmental stan-
dards, was required to pay the port fees. 14
The result of the Cali decision exemplifies the broadening flexibility
of EU legislation. The decision suggests that pollution prevention is not
a strictly private industrial or commercial activity, even if monitored
and enforced by a private business. SEPG was not simply a private
business seeking a profit.15 Therefore, the private anti-pollution sur-
veillance and prevention with the proper State or EU authorization is
loosely interpreted as an essential function of the State.16 This dual
7. Competition Rules Do Not Cover Pollution Surveillance Firms, THE REUTER
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REPORT, Mar. 18, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, Current News
Library, European Union File [hereinafter Competition Rules].
8. EU: Anti-Pollution Monitoring in the Port of Genoa is a General Interest Service
not Subject to Competition Rules, THE REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Mar. 19, 1997, at 1,
available in LEXIS, Current News Library, European Union File.
9. Court Judgement on Anti-Pollution Services Payments, THE REUTER EUR.
COMMUNITY REP., Apr. 15, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, Current News Library, Euro-
pean Union File [hereinafter Court Judgment].
10. Diego Cali, 1997 E.C.R. 1 25.
11. Id. J1 19, 22.
12. Id. 1 25.
13. Id.1 23; see also Case C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft v. Europcontrol, 1994 E.C.R.
1-43, 1 30.
14. Id. 1 25.
15. Competition Rules, supra note 7, at 1.
16. Court Judgement, supra note 9, at 2.
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approach of classifying private and public activities when enforcing en-
vironmental standards according to competition law provides a general,
definitional framework for applying the EU laws. It also allows Mem-
ber States to place a high importance on public, environmental inter-
ests, even if the services are achieved through unfair competition by
private businesses. 17 In addition and of even greater importance, the
broad interpretation of EU law by the ECJ allows more sovereign na-
tions within Europe to enthusiastically, efficiently, and uniformly apply
the flexible EU legislation. In contrast, the broad interpretation of EU
law does present difficulties and uncertainties when specifically deter-
mining how or what EU regional law applies to private business activi-
ties for both the current members of the EU and aspiring future mem-
bers.18
In recognition of this evolving problem and potentially confusing
legal approach of the Cali case, the first part of this article analyzes the
development and reasons for the legal evolution of integrating competi-
tion and environmental EU law as an example of broadening interna-
tional legal integration. The expansive legal integration is examined in
three distinct sections: EU Competition and Environmental Laws, Inte-
gration of EU Environmental and Competition Law, and Impact of Le-
gal Integration on the EU Expansion.
Sections A and B of Part II explain the histories of EU competition
and environmental laws, respectively. They present a brief foundation
and developmental explanation of both EU laws. Historically, for ex-
ample, when the European Community (EC) originated in 1957, under
the EC Treaty of Rome, Europe's main legal concerns focused upon eco-
nomic coordination and free market competition.1 9 Thus, the EC Treaty
contains specific laws, such as Articles 85, 86, and 90, which ensure fair
economic competition. 20 In comparison, however, the EC did not spe-
cifically regulate the environment until the early 1970s. 21 In fact, the
17. Competition Rules, supra note 7, at 1.
18. Diego Cali & Figli Srl v. Servici Ecologici Porto Di Genova SpA (SEPG), in ENVTL
L. REP. 31, 31-35 (Environmental Law Institute ed., 1998).
19. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
85(1), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EC TREATY]. The EC Treaty, amended several times
appears in its most current form as The Treaty Establishing the European Union, Feb.7,
1992, 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter MAASTRICHT TREATY]. Because the 1992 Maas-
tricht Treaty is a revision of the original 1957 EC Treaty, it contains essentially all of the
previous EC Treaty articles regarding competition law. Therefore, in the Competition
Law section the EC and Maastricht Treaty will be used interchangeably. However, the
Environmental provisions and Monetary Union provisions were first legally introduced to
the EU through the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, the two sections of this article will dif-
ferentiate between the two distinct Treaties when appropriate.
20. Id. arts. 85, 86, and 90.
21. Marcel Brus, Balancing National and European Competence in Environmental
Law, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 633, 634 (1994).
VOL. 27:4688
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S LEGAL INTEGRATION
original EC Treaty never even mentioned the word "environment."22
Rather, EU environmental law evolved more slowly through several
conventions, programs, directives, and eventually resulted in a revision
of the EC Treaty, including Articles 100a and 130r-t. 23
Part II, Section C focuses on the current status of coordinating en-
vironmental and competition law. This section presents in detail the
choice of law issues that challenge the environmental businesses in the
EU when attempting to apply the proper environmental law. For in-
stance, current environmental law applied by businesses integrates in-
ternational, regional, and national regulations based on governmental
authority.24 This is especially true in the environmental area at issue
in the Cali case, marine pollution prevention. However, as private
companies continue to acquire the responsibility of enforcing govern-
ment standards, they must simultaneously balance the natural, capi-
talistic objective of earning a competitive profit. Due to this conflicting
balance of interests, the defining line of public and private activities as
a legal basis becomes less distinct and more ambiguously integrated.25
Finally, the unique issue presented by the Cali case of integrating
EU competition and environmental laws affects not only the current
Member States of the EU,26 but also future members, and/or current as-
sociate members of the EU.27 In order for the Central and Eastern
European countries to earn membership to the EU, they must first
harmonize their legal systems with the EU standards. 28 For this rea-
son, Part II, Section D of this article discusses the effect of integrating
competition and environmental laws on the prospect of eastward EU
expansion.
The four Sections of Part II of this article regarding the Cali case
present an opportunity to better understand the ramifications of the
broadening EU laws and the relevant factors for determining the spe-
cific effects of integrating environmental and competition laws.
A. European Union Competition and Environmental Law
Economic integration and the creation of a common market estab-
lished the goals of forming the European Economic Community in
22. See EC TREATY, supra note 19, art. 85(1).
23. Brus, supra note 21, at 634-71.
24. ALEXANDER KISS & DINAH SHELTON, MANUAL OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 342 (1997).
25. Herbert Ungerer, EC Competition Law in the Telecommunications, Media, and
Information Technology Sectors, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1111, 1112 (1996).
26. John F. Casalino, Shaping Environmental Law and Policy of Central and Eastern
Europe: The European Union's Critical Role, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 227 (1995).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 234-55.
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1957.29 The original economic integration incorporated four essential
freedoms; the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital be-
tween the Member States of the Community.30 The EC Treaty created
the institution and legal provisions to ensure free and fair competition
in the common market by requiring the harmonization of Member
States' laws. 31 The Community, now known as the European Union
(EU) continues the momentum of an ever expanding union as it coordi-
nates not only transnational trade and commerce, but also as the EU
harmonizes competition and environmental policies. 32 Therefore, the
importance of the EU legal development exists not only because the
economic strength of the common market, but also because of the exten-
sive regional integration of policies and laws extends well beyond the
basics of market economics. 33
1. Development of EU Competition Law
As mentioned above, initially the EC Treaty established the basic
legal framework for free, fair, and equal economic competition within
the common market.34 The Community's mainstream, neoclassical view
of competition is founded on the economic notion that the equilibrium
will encourage the optimal allocation of resources. 35 In ideal economic
terms, this means that if people demanding a resource, such as a good
or service, can freely pay a price equal to the fair market value, the re-
source supply will be used for its best value and most efficient pur-
pose.36 However, the EC Treaty also recognized the imperfections of
free economic competition such as monopoly power, externalizes, and
public goods. 37 Firms that possess an unequal and dominant degree of
market power have the ability to unfairly influence the market price
and distort the socially optimal allocation of resources.38 Not surpris-
ingly, the Community set forth provisions that monitor the Member
29. Rudiger Dohms, The Development of a Competitive Internal Energy Market in the
European Community, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 805 (1994).
30. Dr. Klause Sommerlad & Peter Scherer, The Provision of Utility Services in a
Unified Europe, 4 U. MIAMI Y. B. INT'L L. 73, 74 (1995).
31. See Dohms, supra note 29, at 805.
32. Alexander Black, European Law and Public Utility Open Access, 10 FLA. J. INT'L
L. 117, 119 (1995).
33. Todd R. Overton, Substantive Distinctions Between United States Antitrust Law
and the Competition Policy of the European Community, 13 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 315, 317
(1991).
34. See Black, supra note 32, at 119.
35. M.J. Arts & N. Lee, Competition Policy, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION: POLICY AND ANALYSIS 119, 123 (1994).
36. Id. at 120.
37. See EC TREATY, supra note 19, arts. 85, 86.
38. David Young & Stan Metcalfe, Competition Policy, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, 119-38 (1994).
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States' anti-competition behaviors. 39 The primary provisions of the EC
Treaty that preserve fair competition are Articles 85, 86, and 90.40 In
general, Article 85 deals with restrictive agreements creating anti-
competitive behavior; Article 86 deals with the abuse of dominant mar-
ket power which effectively prevents competition; and finally, Article 90
deals with exceptions that allow monopoly conduct for efficient public
enterprises. 41
a. Article 85 of the EC Treaty
Article 85 focuses specifically on the prohibition of anti-competitive
cooperation resulting from agreements or concerted practices between
independent enterprises. 42 The substantive test of anti-competitive ac-
tivity from Article 85(1) is "the prevention, restriction, or distortion of
competition within the common market."43 The primary application of
the article is concerned with the behavior and the coordination of com-
mercial procedures, rather than the structural changes in the market
place. 44 For example, a business agreement by a dominant corporation
to purchase or privatize one of its less threatening competitors, suppli-
ers, or customers, which would increase the privatized entity's market
power, may violate Article 85 of the EC Treaty. The violation depends
upon the "object or effect" of the agreement strenthening the entity's
market power. 45 Namely, if the purchase agreement creates a "two-
way" flow of information that generates advantages for the two entities
of the agreement, while disadvantaging the non-integrated competition,
the agreement is prohibited anti-competitive behavior pursuant Article
85(1).46
On the other hand, the EU Commission may grant "negative clear-
ance" in accordance with Article 85(3), which allows an exemption to
the agreement's facial violation of Article 85(1).47 For example, the EU
applied negative clearance exceptions in the following two business
mergers because each agreement provided superior consumer products
at lower prices.48 The EU allowed the anti-competitive merger of a
German manufacturing firm, Hummel and its Belgium distributing
39. See Arts & Lee, supra note 35, at 119.
40. Id. See also, EC Treaty, supra note 19, arts. 85, 86, and 90.
41. PATIRZIo BIANCHI, INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 91-100
(1998).
42. Mario Siragusa, Privatization and EC Competition Law, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J.
999, 1027 (1996).
43. EC TREATY, supra note 19, art. 85(1).
44. See Siragusa, supra note 42, at 1044.
45. See BIANCHI, supra note 41, at 95-97.
46. Siragusa, supra note 42, at 1045.
47. Id. at 1045, 1060.
48. Id.
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firm, Isbeque in 1965. 49 Again in 1988, the EU permitted a merger be-
tween AEI and its supplier, Reyroll Parsons.50
b. Article 86 of the EC Treaty
Like Article 85, Article 86 specifically prohibits abusive conduct by
dominant enterprises, such as direct, unilateral exploitation of market
power that causes a substantial reduction of competition.5 1 Market
dominance is not prohibited by Article 86 per se. Rather, Article 86
prohibits conduct that strengthens unequal market control by reducing
efficient competition. 52 In contrast with Article 85, however, Article 86
focuses more narrowly on the behavior of the entity and not on the con-
certed agreement forming the monopoly.53 Furthermore, the applica-
tion of Article 86 depends again, on the "object or effects" doctrine by
"taking into account the nature of the reciprocal undertakings entered
into and the competitive position of the various contracting parties on
the market or markets in which they operated."54 Article 86 does not
prohibit ex anti the merger agreement between firms even if it is evi-
dent that monopoly power will result from the behavior. Rather, Article
86 frequently establishes a loophole for an Article 85 violation by,
again, only enforcing anticompetition sanctions for exploitative eco-
nomic behaviors by dominant market powers ex post. 5
Despite the same "object or effect" doctrine as Article 85, the EU
Commission's application of Article 86 provides a much stricter en-
forcement of regulation against anti-competitive behavior. For exam-
ple, the judgment in Philip Morris Holland BV v. Commission of the
European Communities indicated that the acquisition of a minority in-
terest by a dominant competitor that "results in effective control of the
other company or at least in some influence on its commercial policy"
may violate Article 86 as an abuse of a dominant position. 56 Later in
49. See BIANCHI, supra note 41, at 97.
50. Id.
51. See EC TREATY, supra note 19, art. 86.
52. See Case T-78/89, Societa Italiana Vetro, 1992 E.C.R. 11-14033 360; see also
Case 6/72, Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 245.
53. See BIANCHI, supra note 41, at 1048.
54. See Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 550 1 116.
55. See Case 43/88, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen & Silver Line Reiseb Degreesuro v. Zen-
trale Zu Bek Degreesampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerb, 1989 E.C.R. 803 37. The Com-
mission applied Article 86 of the EC Treaty and excused the behavior of the undertakings
based on the oligopoly market exception, even as it found concerted action contrary to Ar-
ticle 85. Id.
56. See Case 730/79, Philip Morris Holland BV v. Commission of the European Com-
munitie, 1980 E.C.R. 2671, 2 C.M.L.R. 321 (1981) 1 65. The European Court declined the
application of Articles 85 and 86 to this acquisition because the transaction at issue did
not enable Philip Morris to control or influence Rothmans' conduct nor did it grant the
entities concerted or coordinated activities. Id.
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1992, the Commission applied the Philip Morris doctrine to the Gillette
case, in which it ruled Article 86 applied to a passive investment made
by Gillette because the new entity earned new company rights and held
a dominant position in the EU market.5 7 The Commission simply de-
termined the Gillette behavior weakened competition in the market and
created new barriers to potential entry and therefore amounted to an
abuse of dominant position within the EU. 58
In light of the EU Commission's evolving application of Article 85
and 86 of the EC Treaty, the following generalizations of EU competi-
tion law indicate when that law will be applied to regulate competitive
behavior. First, the agreement or behavior must aim to acquire influ-
ence over an entity to syndicate a competitive, normally vertical rela-
tionship. 59 Second, the relationship must be likely to result in effective
control over the target market, or at least significant commercial influ-
ence. 60 Finally, the arrangement should not merely constitute a passive
investment conveying no rights or authoritative influence over the
market power. 61
c. Article 90 of the EC Treaty
In addition to Articles 85 and 86, which define EU competition law,
Article 90 of the EC Treaty grants Member States the liberty to protect
certain enterprises that provide goods and services for public consum-
ers.62 As mentioned above, because the EU continues to develop envi-
ronmental laws to serve and protect the general public, competition and
environmental laws continue to merge in case law. 63
Article 90 establishes an exception to EU competition law by al-
lowing Member States to develop monopolies or oligopolies.64 The ex-
clusive rights are conditioned on the necessity to preserve a general,
public economic interest and must be entrusted to the State under Arti-
cle 90(2) as established by the 1993 Re Corbeau judgment. 65 However,
57. Commission Decision No. 93/252/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 116) 21 [hereinafter Gillette].
58. See Siragusa, supra note 42, at 1031.
59. See YOUNG & METCALFE, supra note 38, at 138. The EU Commission recognizes
both horizontal, meaning two competitors in the same production position, i.e. manufac-
turer and manufacturer, as well as vertical cooperative relationships, meaning supplier
and manufacturer. The EU case law is, however, much more prevalent for vertical anti-
competition. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. See also Siragusa, supra note 42, at 1035.
62. In correlation with Article 90, Article 222 further allows Member States to freely
develop a sovereign system of property ownership, which may include state enterprises.
63. See, Diego Cali, 1997 E.C.R. 16.
64. See Dohms, supra note 29, at 814; see also Dana L. Romaniuk, Regulating Public
Monopolies in Furtherance of the EEC Free Competition Goal: Article 90 and the Two-Step
Approach, 69 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1025, 1026 (1994).
65. Case 320/91, Re Carbeau, 1993 ECR 1-2533; see also Dohms, supra note 29, at
1999
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pursuant to 90(1), public enterprises may not grant exclusive rights
that unnecessarily violate EU competition regulations. 66 Although Ar-
ticle 90 is commonly applied to public entities, it is neutral as to the
ownership of the business and only distinguishes between public and
private enterprises on a functional level.67 This means the purpose of
Article 90 is not to simply protect State-granted exclusive rights or
authorized monopolies. Rather, it ensures that certain services of gen-
eral economic interest for public consumers are protected from competi-
tion.68 For example, one of the most often and closely examined appli-
cations of Article 90 is the public energy sector, whereby the
neoclassical economic equilibrium is superseded by the efficiency of en-
suring universal services. 69 The ECJ acknowledged this perspective of
EU Competition laws in the 1994 Almelo v. Energiebedriff Ijsselmij
judgment.70 In the Almelo case, the ECJ concluded that despite the
Dutch electricity sector's violation of Article 85 and 86 by exploiting a
dominant position, Article 90(2) allowed the restriction of competition
because it was necessary to the particular mission of providing national
electricity.71
In overview, the enforcement of Article 90 concerns three objec-
tives. First, 90(1) legalizes state monopolies. 72 Second, 90(2) focuses on
the derivative application of Article 90 in relation to services in the
public sector. 73 Third, the competence of the EU to enact decisions and
directives is the concern of Article 90(3).74
One of the first legal interpretations of Article 90's objectives oc-
curred in the Guiseppe Sacchi case.75 In Sacchi, the ECJ allowed Italy
to grant special and exclusive rights to a television broadcasting enter-
prise because it provided public services, yet it did not specifically re-
gard the market behavior as incompatible with Article 86 of the EC
Treaty. 76 Furthermore, the ECJ expanded the Sacchi ruling in the ERT
821.
66. Romaniuk, supra note 64, at 1004.
67. See Case 41/90, Hoefner v. Macrotron, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1979, 2016 21 (citing pre-
vious decision where ECJ ruled that "in the context of competition law.., the concept of
an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of
the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed.")
68. See Dohms, supra note 29, at 821.
69. For additional analysis of the EU Competition Law and the Energy sector see,
Alexander J. Black, European Law and Public Utility Open Access, 10 FLA. J. INT'L L. 117
(1995). See also Sommerlad & Scherer, supra note 30.
70. Case 393/92, Almelo v. Energiebedriff ljsselmij, 1994 E.R.C. 1-1477.
71. See Dohms, supra note 29, at 824-827.
72. WOLF SAUTER, COMPETITION LAW AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE EU 148 (1997).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Case 155/73, Guiseppe Sacchi (Preliminary ruling requested by the Tribunale di
Biella), 1974 E.R.C. 409, 2 C.M.L.R. 177 (1974).
76. Id.
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v. Dimotiki case 77 by prohibiting exclusive monopoly rights in situations
where the behavior directly violated Article 86 of the EC Treaty.
The legal interpretation of upholding Article 86 relative to Article
90 is not, however, without legal contradiction. Although Article 86
trumps Article 90 in the majority of EU cases, occasionally, the ECJ
rules in favor of permitting monopolistic dominant positions, even if the
behavior itself infringes on the provisions of Article 86, as exemplified
in the Hoefner v. Macrotron and Regie des Telegraphes et des Telephones
v. SA GB INNO-BM cases.78 Usually, the ECJ grants justification for
preserving exclusive, monopoly rights when the enterprise protects a
public interest and fulfills the proportionality test.79 This two-pronged
requirement is defined by Article 90(2) of the EC Treaty, providing that
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general eco-
nomic interest may be exempted from the application of competition
rules contained in the Treaty. These rules apply in so far as is neces-
sary to restrict competition, or even to exclude all competition, from
other economic operators in order to ensure the performance of the par-
ticular tasks assigned to them.8 0
The third issue concerning interpretation of Article 90 is the EU's
right to enact directives and decisions under Article 90(3).81 This leg-
islative power of the Commission has been contested because the direc-
tives are enforceable against the Member States without approval by
the Council or European Parliament. This structure disrupts the EU
institutional balance of power.8 2 Despite contradictory, unilateral
Commission power, Article 90(3) has been further approved by the ECJ
in the Terminal Directive and Spain, Belgium & Italy v. E.C. Commis-
sion cases.8 3 The Terminal Directive decision defined the Commission's
power to issue directives under Article 90(3) regarding legal monopo-
lies, as well as the power to suppress them.8 4 Furthermore, the cases
reiterated the Commission's right to make general directives which
specify the application of Article 90(3) and suggested the article's appli-
cation could be enacted for the postal service, gas, electricity, insurance,
and transport markets.85 In summary, the EU regulates business com-
petition behavior primarily through the provisions of Articles 85, 86,
77. Case 260/89, ERT v. Dimotiki, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2925, 2962 37.
78. See Macrotron, supra note 67, at 1 21; see also Case 18/88, Regie des Telegraphes
et des Telephones v. SA GB INNO-BM, 1991 E.R.C. 1-5951.
79. See EC TREATY, supra note 19, art. 90(2).
80. Id.
81. See Siragusa, supra note 42, at 1079.
82. See SAUTER, supra note 72, at 154-55.
83. Case 202/88, French Republic v. Commission, 1991 E.R.C. 1-1223; Joined Cases
271, 281 & 289/90, Spain, Belgium and Italy v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. 1-5833.
84. See French Republic, 1991 E.R.C. 1233 at n. 162.
85. See Joined Cases 271, 281 & 289/90, Spain, Belgium & Italy v. E.C. Commission
1992 E.C.R 5834.
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and 90. Although the EC Treaty includes additional articles and regu-
lations relating to competition, these three articles provide the most
fundamental understanding of EU competition law.
8 6
B. Development of EU Environmental Law
As Europe integrates economically through trade and various busi-
ness transactions, the competition laws are not the only broadening le-
gal developments that affect transnational boundaries within the Euro-
pean Union.8 7 The environmental policies of nations, regions, and the
world as a whole are assuming integrated dimensions as well.88 Several
catastrophes in Europe exemplify the scope of the environmental crisis
and the international need to coordinate laws to protect the environ-
ment. For example, in 1976, Seveson, Italy experienced a chemical ex-
plosion that forced food restrictions and evacuations in contaminated
areas of Italy and Switzerland.8 9 In 1986, Switzerland fought a chemi-
cal fire which resulted in the release of 824 tons of insecticide, seventy-
one tons of herbicide, thirty-nine tons of fungicide, four tons of solvents,
and twelve tons of organic compounds containing mercury that con-
taminated the Rhine river and devastated France, Germany, the Neth-
erlands, and Switzerland. 90 Therefore, as environmental issues know
no national boundaries, it is essential to better understand the expan-
sive application of environmental law in the EU as a whole. The fol-
lowing analysis will briefly explain the primary environmental legal de-
velopment within the Community.
1. EC Treaty and Community Legislation
As mentioned before, the original version of EC Treaty, which
formed the original European Common Market, neglected to address
the environment. The EC Treaty of 1957 neither expressly referred to
environmental concerns nor even included the words "environment" or
"pollution."91 However, in the 1960's when environmental issues began
to earn importance in the world, the EC led the legal development by
broadly defining its jurisdiction over regional environmental issues
through Articles 36, 100, and 235.92 Specifically, Article 36 provides
Member States the authority to limit imports and exports in order to
86. Jan H. Jans, State Aid and Article 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty: Does the Polluter
Really Pay, 75 EUR. ENVTL L. REV. 108, 108-115 (1995).
87. Susan Polizzotto & Patricia L. LaTulippe, The European Community in 1992: An
Integrated Approach to Economy and Ecology, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1759 (1990).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1759-60.
90. Id.
91. See generally EC TREATY, supra note 19.
92. Id. arts. 36, 100, and 235.
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protect the health and life of persons, animals, and plants. 93 Article 100
enables the Community to harmonize Member States' laws through
various directives that uphold the functioning of the common market. 94
Article 235 grants the European Council the authority to take "appro-
priate measures" to "attain, in the course of the operation of the com-
mon market, one of the objectives of the Community" when the "[t]reaty
has not provided the necessary powers" to do so. 95
Because the original EC Treaty provisions presented only general-
ized authority for the EC to regulate the environment, the individual
Member States retained the primary responsibility for enacting envi-
ronmental policy.96 Thus, in addition to the EC Treaty provisions, the
EC began to issue Community-wide environmental standards in the
early 1970s, that harmonized Member States' responsibilities through
three types of legislation: regulations, decisions, and directives. In the
EC, and currently in the EU, a regulation assumes immediate effect in
the Member States automatically, without national government ap-
proval. A decision also binds the Member States automatically, but
usually addresses specific, non-common legislative or legal issues. In
comparison, a directive instructs the Member States to adopt or amend
particular legislation in conformity with the EU directive within a par-
ticular time period.9 7 Due to the greater respect for the Member State's
sovereignty, the EC mainly created environmental law in the 1970s
through directives. For instance, the EC drafted directives regarding
regulations against air pollution caused by motor vehicles, 98 biodegrad-
ability of detergents,99 and the sulfur content of certain fuel oils. 100
Early in the development of EC environmental law, the desire to
unify the economies in Europe through efficient harmonization of envi-
ronmental standards was not the only catalyst for environmental policy.
Additionally, and more sobering than the economic incentives, the oc-
currence of the devastating 1967 "Torrey Canyon" and 1978 "Amoco
Cadiz" disasters also encouraged the EC to coordinate environmental
laws.O1 Both of these tanker accidents resulted in massive oil spills,
which polluted long stretches of the beach and reduced biodiversity by
killing many plants and animals of the regional ecosystem. 10 2 These
events forced Europe to realize that something more needed to be done
93. Id. art. 36.
94. Id art. 100.
95. Id. art. 235.
96. See Polizzotto & LaTulippe, supra note 87, at 1763.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Council Directive 70/220, 1970 O.J. (L 76) 1.
99. See, e.g., Council Directive 73/404, 1973 O.J. (L 347) 51.
100. See, e.g., Council Directive 75/716, 1975 O.J. (L 307) 22.
101. Brus, supra note 21, at 634-671; see also KisS & SHELTON, supra note 24, at 342;
see generally, EC TREATY, supra note 19.
102. Brus, supra note 21, at 636.
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in order to coordinate the environmental policy of the Community. 103
2. Environmental Action Programmes I-V
In 1972, the Member States met in Paris to establish an environ-
mental program that did not sacrifice economic harmonization. Rather,
the Paris Summit Conference created the opportunity to diminish vari-
ances in living standards and improve the quality of life through EC
environmental standards. 104 The First Environmental Action Pro-
gramme (EAP) resulted from the Paris Summit in the form of a "Decla-
ration of the Council and the Representatives of the Member States."'10 5
Four years later, the EC created the Second Environmental Action
Programme of 1977 that focused on the reduction of regional pollution
and rational, efficient resource management. 10 6 In 1983, the Third En-
vironmental Action Programme added the prevention policies and de-
clared that social and economic EC policies should not exacerbate envi-
ronmental problems. 107 The Fourth Environmental Action Programme
focused on the adoption of high protection and quality standards in
1987.108 Most importantly, it coordinated environmental policy with all
other EC policies.10 9 Finally, the Fifth Environmental Action Pro-
gramme covers 1992-2000.110 The fifth policy aims to sustain the status
quo of the environment while maintaining economic and social devel-
opment in the EU.111
Although the EAP's established clear and novel institutional envi-
ronmental standards, they are only declarations of harmonized policy.
The EAP's neither provide an automatically binding legal basis for EU
legislation nor attribute any legal power to the Community under Arti-
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of the Represen-
tatives of the Governments of the Member States, 1973-1977 O.J. SPEC. ED. (C 112) 1.
The legal effect of the EC declaration is similar to a regulation, in that the Member
States' governments must approve and accept the official decision of the Community. In
contrast, however, the declaration does not have to be accepted as a whole, rather the na-
tional governments may only conditionally adopt the EC legislation. Id. at 3 n.8.
106. Council Resolution on the Continuation and Implementation of a European
Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environment, 1977 O.J. (C 139) 1.
107. See Council Resolution on the Continuation and Implementation of a European
Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environment 1982-1986 SPEC. ED. O.J.
(C 46) 1.
108. See id.
109. See Council Resolution on the Continuation and Implementation of a European
Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environment, 1987-1992 SPEC. ED. O.J.
(C 328) 1.
110. See Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the
Member States, 1993 O.J. (C 138) 1.
111. Id.
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cle 189 of the EC Treaty. 1 2 Again, the Community could only rely on
the general EC Treaty provisions of Article 100 and 235 as the prelimi-
nary legal basis of the instituted environmental policy.' 1 3
Nonetheless, the first judicial recognition of the environmental
policy occurred in 1985, when the ECJ acknowledged the environmental
policy as an important Community objective.' 14 A year later in Com-
mission v. Denmark, the Court ruled again, that EC environmental
policy is an essential mission of the Community, based upon Articles
100 and 235.115 In this landmark case, the Commission changed Den-
mark's environmental restrictions because they unduly violated EC free
trade provisions. 116 The ECJ held that a Member State could enact and
enforce economic restrictions based upon "necessary" national environ-
mental standards only if they do not excessively restrict competing
countries or infringe upon free trade. 117 Therefore, to the extent Den-
mark's environmental regulations unduly restricted trade and did not
exercise the least drastic enforcement measures, the Court did not up-
hold the national environmental policy." i8 Nevertheless, the principle
of environmental protection as a mandatory requirement of legal and
economic consideration was finally recognized in the EC. 119
3. Single European Act and Maastricht Treaty
Eventually, in 1987, the EC amended the original EC Treaty with
the Single European Act (SEA), which dealt specifically with the envi-
ronment.' 20 The SEA introduced Title VII, explicitly granting the EC
legal power to legislate environmental policy. 12 1 The EC added Article
100a, enabling harmonization of environmental legislation. 122 Addition-
ally, new Articles 130r, 130s, and 130t presented the objectives of the
EC environmental policy, standardized the procedure for implementing
environmental policy, and provided the opportunity to create more
strict national environmental measures. 123 Furthermore, the newly
added provisions provided that environmental damage should be pre-
vented at the source and reiterated the First EAP's principle, the pol-
112. See Brus, supra note 21, at 637.
113. See KISS & SHELTON, supra note 24, at 243-46.
114. Case 240/83, Procureur de la Republique v. Association de defense des bruleurs
d'huiles usagees (ADBHU), 1985 E.C.R. 5331 549.
115. Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark (In re Disposable Beer Cans), 1988 E.C.R.
4607 at 4630 [hereinafter Disposable Beer Cans].
116. Id.
117. See Polizzotto & LaTulippe, supra note 87, at 1773.
118. See Disposable Beer Cans, 1988 E.C.R. at 4627-30.
119. See Polizzotto & LaTulippe, supra note 87, at 1773-74.
120. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
121. Id at 3.
122. Id. at 4.
123. Id. at 5-6.
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luter is responsible to pay damage costs.124 Even though most of the
previous environmental legislation was adopted through Articles 100
and 235, the new provisions allowed the EC to streamline and unionize
the standards in order to more realistically and efficiently complete the
EC goal of a Single Market by 1992.125 The anticipated economic
growth associated with the establishment of the Internal Market intro-
duced fear of diverse environmental standards that would inhibit free
and fair EC trade. 126
The Treaty on the European Union, also known as the Maastricht
Treaty, enumerated a number of new environmental policies that be-
came effective November 1, 1993.127 The Maastricht Treaty retained
the new SEA provisions, specifically Articles 100a, 130r, 130s, and
130t.1 28 Additionally, one of the primary principles inserted in EU en-
vironmental law was the precautionary principle of Article 130r(2). 129
The principle idea originated in Germany and has grown in popularity
within the EU because it grants Member States the ability to adopt na-
tional preventative environmental standards before harm occurs. 130
Furthermore, due to the ambiguous requirements of the precautionary
environmental policy within the Maastricht Treaty, the EU adopted
specific definitions of environmental law through agreements such as
the United Nations Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes that defines the pre-
cautionary principle as:
Action to avoid the potential transboundary impact of the release of
hazardous substances shall not be postponed on the grounds that sci-
entific research has not fully proved a causal link between those sub-
stances, on the one hand, and the potential transboundary impact, on
the other hand.131
The Maastricht Treaty further integrated the obligation of harmo-
nizing environmental law with other EU legislation. For example, the
revised Article 130r(2) states that "environmental protection require-
ments must be integrated into the definition and implementation of
124. See Polizzotto & LaTulippe, supra note 87, at 1766.
125. See Brus, supra note 21, at 640.
126. Isabelle Martin, The Limitations of a Uniform Environmental Policy in the Euro-
pean Union, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 675 (1994).
127. See generally MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 19.
128. See Brus, supra note 21, at 652-655 (citing a detailed analysis of the procedure,
objectives, and principle provisions of the reiterated SEA Articles 100a, 130r, 130s, and
130t).
129. See MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 19, art. 130r(2).
130. B. VERHOEVE ET AL., INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
MAASTRICHT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 12, 15 (1992).
131. Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
151/PC/W9.11/L.26 (Vol. I) (1992).
VOL. 27:4700
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S LEGAL INTEGRATION
other Community policies."132 Thus, the EU established that the new
priority is avoiding environmental nuisances with preventative meas-
ures, while still upholding other EU economic policies, rather than re-
sponding to environmental damages that clash with other EU poli-
cies.133
Another primary principle integrated in the Maastricht Treaty is
the polluter pays principle. Although the EC previously established
this legal responsibility in the First EAP, the EU ensured the principle
as automatically binding EU law through the Maastricht Treaty by im-
posing the burden of the pollution costs on the emitter of the pollution,
rather than on the general public. 3 4
In 1996, a number of EU studies and assessments evaluated the
implementation of regional environmental regulations. The European
Commission adopted a communication that proposed minimum regional
standards for environmental inspections by Member States entitled
"Implementing Community Environmental Law." 135 Furthermore, Di-
rective 96/61/EC created the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Con-
trol (IPPC) plan, which established a committee structure for Member
States, the industry, and the European Commission together to define
the pollution control standards. 136
The Member States are still challenged with the difficulty of inter-
preting community directives in accordance with national laws. For ex-
ample, Finland struggled with this in 1996. Pursuant to Directive
67/548/EEC, as a new EU member, Finland was required to transpose
all successive EC environmental regulations in accordance with na-
tional requirements. Recognizing this is a time consuming and difficult
process for the new Member States, the Commission expanded the na-
tional freedom for implementing EU measures. 137 The EU also pro-
posed uniform implementation and enforcement assistance through
Implementation & Enforcement of EU Environmental Law (IMPEL).138
IMPEL has become increasingly influential in the past few years, espe-
cially as the EU expands eastward with new members. 139
132. See Martin, supra note 126, at 690.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 650.
135. Fourteenth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community law
(1996), EUR. COM., 14th Sess., Doc. No. C 332 (May 29, 1997) 65.
136. Id. at 67.
137. Id. at 70 (citing the EU Directive 90/313/EEC as the legislative basis for the ex-
panding national liberty with environmental regulations.)
138. Id. at 70-71.
139. Id.
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C. Integration of EU Competition and Environmental Law
1. Choosing the Appropriate Legal Basis
After understanding the basic development of EU environmental
law, it becomes clear that numerous legal approaches are possible in a
particular anti-pollution situation. 40 Therefore, it is not always clear
which legal basis is most appropriate, especially in situations of preven-
tative protection of the marine environment such as at issue in the Cali
case. However it is conceivable to organize the EU environmental law
applicable to the Cali case into three levels of law: international, re-
gional, and national.' 4 '
a. International EU Environmental Law
In the area of preventative marine environment protection, inter-
national law plays a very large part, primarily because many marine
waters lie outside national jurisdiction.1 42 For instance, the territorial
waters may be one nationality, the shipping vessel traveling the waters
may be from another country, while the captain and crew may be a
third nationality. In such an internationally diverse situation, numer-
ous countries must coordinate their laws in order to achieve the ulti-
mate goal of protecting the marine environment. 143
For this reason, the international community organized interna-
tional principles governing the subject of international law of the sea in
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). 144 The United Nations Environmental Program also elabo-
rated international marine protection through a system of regulating
"regional seas." 145 The Mediterranean Sea program established proto-
cols against pollution by oil and other hazardous substances in 1976.146
The Convention to protect the Black Sea against pollution caused by
harmful dumping came into force in Bucharest on April 21, 1992. 147
Even more specific to the Cali case is the subject of shipping oil,
which is addressed as international law monitoring vessel-source pollu-
tion pursuant to Articles 194(3)(b), 211, 217 through 221 of
UNCLOS.148 These provisions regulate the specifics of transport vessels
140. See Martin, supra note 126, at 695-97.
141. See KIss & SHELTON, supra note 24, at 470.
142. Id.
143. See VERHOEVE, supra note 130, at 15.
144. See Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 24, at 471.
145. Id.
146. Mediterranean Sea Program, 1976 O.J. (L 129).
147. KISS & SHELTON, supra note 24, at 342.
148. Id. at 343.
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and adopt norms to prevent, reduce, and control pollution. Essentially,
the primary enforcement responsibilities for protecting the marine en-
vironment are allocated according to the 360 kilometer exclusive eco-
nomic zone. 149
Another important body of international law preventing marine
pollution is the Marine Pollution global conference (MARPOL) adopted
on November 2, 1973.150 Similar to the UNCLOS articles, MARPOL de-
fined state obligations to regulate behaviors which may pollute the ma-
rine environment.
b. Regional EU Environmental Law
Continuing the standards set forth by MARPOL, the 1974 Baltic
Sea Convention and revised Helsinki Convention of 1992 further re-
fined the international marine regulations according to stricter Euro-
pean, regional specifications and control.11
Additionally, the EU marine environment law consists of approxi-
mately twenty directives. 152 The most important is Directive 76/464 of
May 4, 1976, which relates to harmful substances discharged into the
waters of the Community.' 53 Few laws relate specifically to the territo-
rial marine waters and the precautionary protection of the marine envi-
ronment as does Directive 79/923 on the quality of water. 5 4 Also, to
preempt environmental damage from marine pollution, Regulation
2978/94 institutes community standards for the carrying allowances of
the regional oil tankers.' 55
c. National EU Environmental Law
Because the EU consists of sovereign countries, the enforcement
responsibility of environmental standards is frequently deferrred to the
Member States.'5 6 Therefore, the national laws are much like regional
or Community law. As the EU continues to integrate economically, so-
cially, environmentally, and legally, the variances decrease between EU
and Member State laws.'5 7 In fact, little national legislation exclusively
deals with marine environment protection. Instead, most countries
simply organize legislation which regulates the water-quality stan-
149. Id. at 344.
150. Id. at 344-45.
151. Id. at 345.
152. See Martin, supra note 126, at 658-66.
153. Council Directive 76/464, 1976 O.J. (112) 1.
154. Council Directive 78/176, 1984 O.J. (54) 1.
155. Council Regulation 2978/94, 1994 O.J. (319) 1.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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dards, monitors the shipping standards within their EEZ,158 or they
simply enact EU Directives. The Pretura Unificata di Torino v. Perso-
nas Unknown case exemplified the EU's allowance of the national
authority to enforce and even exceed the Community's water pollution
standard.159
Another example in which the ECJ ruled the national environ-
mental enforcement is limited by the EU directives is Commission v.
Denmark.160  The ECJ decided that based on Directives 79/831 and
67/548, the Danish law did not sufficiently protect the marine environ-
ment from the risk of pollution from new substances. 61 Thus, the
holding established that although Member States assume the responsi-
bility to enforce the EU legislation, the EU remains the superseding
authority to ensure proper national enforcement.162
The Cali case is a primary example where a national public
authority, Consorzio Autonomo del Porto (CAP), monitors and manages
the administrative and economic functions of the port of Genoa in ac-
cordance with the EU legislative expectations. Pursuant to EU mari-
time law, the national government conferred the regulating capacity
and surveillance enforcement of the oil port of Genoa-Multedo to CAP in
1986, through Order Number Fourteen. 63
In sum, the most important formal procedure by the EU in relation
to national environmental law functions is to ensure correct implemen-
tation of the provisions of Community environmental law. 1 64
2. Integration
a. Original Case Law
In lieu of recognizing the various levels of choosing which EU envi-
ronmental law to apply to a case, the ECJ has specifically addressed
this problem in several cases. For instance, in Commission v. Council 65
the ECJ stated that the legal basis for an environmental measure may
not depend simply on an institution's objective. In contrast, the ECJ
held that the measures appropriate for the case depended on the har-
monization of both conditions to maintain competition and to reduce
158. See KISS & SHELTON, supra note 24, at 345-46.
159. Case 228/87, Pretura Unificata di Torino v. Persons Unknown, 1988 E.C.R. 5099.
160. Case 278/85, Commission v. Denmark, 1987 E.C.R. 4069.
161. Id.
162. See Brus, supra note 21, at 659.
163. See, Diego Cali, 1997 E.C.R. 11 3-6.
164. See Brus, supra note 21, at 659.
165. Case 300/89, Commission v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 1493; Case 45/87, Commission
v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 5545.
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environmental pollution.166
In Commission v. Italy 67 the Court acknowledged that the differ-
ences in national environmental laws can create unequal competition.
Furthermore, the ECJ defined the authority to harmonize the environ-
mental standards based on Articles 100a and 130r. 168 Therefore, re-
sulting from this case is the general EU standard that if the national
environmental regulations unfairly affects free trade and competition,
Article 100a entitles the EU to modify and harmonize the two essential
objectives of fair competition and environmental preservation. 169 How-
ever, the ECJ clouded this decision with the 1993 case, Commission v.
Council.170 The ECJ held that if the objective of a directive is to protect
the environment in accordance with Article 130s, the environmental
measures may affect the EU conditions of competition. 17'
b. The Cali Case
Again turning to the recent Cali decision, the ECJ questioned the
power of a national port authority to uphold preventative pollution
standards for the marine environment of Genoa in light of allegations of
anti-competitive acts per Article 86.172 The basic facts of the case con-
cern Genoa, an Italian marine port that was managed by the CAP, a
public administrative body established by the Italian legislature.' 73
Pursuant to Decree No. 1186 of August 31, 1991, the President of CAP
contracted the service of SEPG to protect the maritime environment
against pollution and accidental spillage. 174  The private Italian oil
shipper, Diego Cali refused to pay anti-pollution surveillance charges to
SEPG. 17 Cali brought a case before the Italian court claiming SEPG
abusively used its dominant market position, as a private environ-
mental company, to charge the anti-pollution fees. 176
The ECJ addressed this question concerning market dominance by
first considering whether SEPG's activity in this case is within the
scope of Article 86 of the EC Treaty. 177 Again, an act that violates EU
166. See Brus, supra note 21, at 633-34.
167. Case 91/79, Commission v. Italy, 1980 E.C.R. 1099; Case 92/79, Commission v.
Italy, 1980 E.C.R. 1115.
168. Case 91/79, Commission v. Italy, 1980 E.C.R. 1099
169. See Brus, supra note 21, at 658.
170. Case 155/91, Commission v. Council, 1993 E.C.R. 1-939.
171. See Brus, supra note 21, at 658.
172. See, Diego Cali, 1997 E.C.R. 1-1547.
173. Court Judgment on Anti-Pollution Services Payments, THE REUTER EUR.
COMMUNITY REP., April 15, 1997, at 1.
174. See, Diego Cali, 1997 E.C.R. 11 1-10.
175. Id. 12.
176. Id. 11 13-14.
177. Id. 1 14.
1999
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
competition laws is an act that is an economic activity of a legal person,
individual or corporate, that is commercial in nature by offering goods
or services. In contrast, if the act is a State exercising official authority
for the public good, Article 86 does not apply to the activity. Here,
SEPG's anti-pollution surveillance fees were charged directly under the
direction and auspices of the Italian government for the purpose of pro-
tecting the marine environment, a public good. Therefore, the State
was acting in accordance with its official authority, and EU competition
law did not apply. 178 Specifically, the ECJ said, "such surveillance is
connected by its nature, its aim and'. . . the exercise of powers relating
to the protection of the environment which are typically those of public
authority. It is not of an economic nature justifying the application of
the treaty rules on competition."'179 Furthermore, the Court held that a
port company, which is entrusted by public authorities to protect the
environment, "even where the port users must pay dues to finance that
surveillance service.. .does not constitute an undertaking within the
meaning of Articles 86 and 90 of the Treaty."'8 0 Thus, the Court held
the application of the competition rules depended upon the classifica-
tion of the activity as public or commercial.' 8 '
The ECJ ruling in the Cali case falls in line with previous applica-
tion of EU competition laws. 82 Although the act may be arguably clas-
sified as an economic private act under the definition of Article 86, Arti-
cle 90 grants Member States the right to protect public interest,
especially environmental interests, in line with the EU environmental
policy. In the Cali case, the ECJ found that the surveillance protection
of the marine environment under the auspices of a public administra-
tion is exempt from EU competition law, even if a private company is
providing the protection service. 8 3 This case demonstrates how the EU
relies on Article 90 to balance the obligation of preserving a free and
competitive market economy with protecting exclusive, environmental
rights for the public interest. 8 4 Thus, it seems that with such broad
national government discretion under EU competition laws, the re-
gional government is simultaneously building credibility for national
protection of the environment, so long as the basic national principles of
the laws are in harmony with the EU principles.
178. See Competition Rules do not Cover Pollution Surveillance Firms, THE REUTER
EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Mar. 18, 1997, at 1.
179. See Diego Cali, 1997 E.C.R. 23.
180. See id. 1 24-25; see also Competition Rules, supra note 7, at 1.
181. See Diego Cali, 1997 E.C.R. 1 26-27.
182. See, e.g. id.
183. Id. 1 23; see also Case 346/92, SAT Fluggesellschaft v. Eurocontrol, 1994 E.C.R. I-
43, 1 30.
184. See Siragusa, supra note 42, at 1068-79.
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D. Impact of Legal Integration on the EU Expansion
As previously stated, the Cali case exemplifies the current devel-
opment and merging of European law with respect to economic competi-
tion and preventative environmental law.18 5 Yet the importance of un-
derstanding the historical development and the current coordination of
these two areas of law is more than a mere current appreciation of
European Union law. Since unification, the European Union created
not only the second largest economic market in the world, but it is also
a dynamically expanding community. In particular, since the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the crumbling of Cold War communism over the Cen-
tral and East European Countries (CEEC), the boundaries of the EU
have continuously crept eastward. 186 In 1995, the EU formally ac-
cepted Austria, Sweden, and Finland as full Member States. Addition-
ally, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia
signed preliminary agreements to become members of the EU.18 7 How-
ever, with the institutional expansion of the EU, the new members
bring different legal traditions, various stages of economic development,
and unique values of environmental preservation.188 Preparing for ad-
ditional eastward integration of Central and East Europe will present
new issues to the EU and future development of competition and envi-
ronmental law.18 9
1. Preparation for CEEC Integration
The European Community recognized the need for transitioning
economic and political relations with CEEC in the late 1980s. 190 The
eastward integration began with a multitude of agreements whereby
the EC agreed to assist national development of a competitive market
economy and align the legal policies with the west. For instance, in No-
vember, 1988, the EC and Hungary enacted a trade, economic, and
commercial cooperation agreement to begin coordinating legal poli-
cies. 191 The EC established a similar agreement between both Poland
and Czechoslovakia in 1989.192 In 1991, the EC formally opened its
market to imports from CEEC and organized institutional frameworks
185. See Casalino, supra note 26, at 228.
186. Colin Jones, Knocking on the EU's Door: Members of East European Countries,
THE BANKER, May 1998, at 43.
187. Id. See also the specific EU Europe Agreements with the CEEC; Poland Europe
Agreement, 1993 O.J. (L 3348), the Hungary Europe Agreement, 1993 O.J. (L 347), the
Czech Republic Europe Agreement, 1994 O.J. (L 360), and the Slovak Republic Europe
Agreement, 1994 O.J. (L 359).
188. Id.
189. See Casalino, supra note 26, at 229-30.
190. Id.
191. See 1988 O.J. (L 27) 1.
192. See 1989 O.J. (L 339) 1; 1989 O.J.(L 88).
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to coordinate economic and social matters. This included Article 238 of
the revised EC Treaty, which specifically authorizes the EU to create
Association Agreements or "Europe" Agreements with other nations in
order to develop future coordination of economics and environmental
policies. 93 Therefore, in 1992, all previous EC agreements with CEEC
were superseded by Interim "Europe" Association Agreements.194 Fur-
thermore, the EU also included chapter 12.2 in the Fifth EAP of 1992,
which exclusively addresses CEEC environmental policy. 195 It estab-
lished environmental strategies for these countries and names the As-
sociation and PHARE196 programs as instruments for environmental
policy and economic competition development. With specific focus on
the environmental cooperation between Eastern and Western Europe,
the foreign ministers of the respected countries met in Lucerne in April
1993, to approve the enactment and financing of the EAP for Central
and Eastern Europe. 197 By February 1, 1994, the EU had accepted Po-
land and Hungary as complete Associated Members of the EU, followed
by the Czech Republic in February, 1995, and Slovakia in June, 1995.
The preparations for EU integration of the associated countries of
CEEC became an obligation for the EU and was discussed on a ministe-
rial level at several European Council meetings' 98 and elaborated spe-
cifically in a White Paper. 199
a. European Agreements
The EU Europe Agreements with individual CEECs commits both
parties to gradually harmonize environmental and competition laws
over the next ten years.200 Title II of the Europe Agreement establishes
specific principles and standards that must be achieved, such as priva-
tization of state owned enterprises and creation of market economies.
In particular, a primary precondition for economic integration into the
EU is "the approximation of the country's existing and future legislation
of that of the Community.. .in particular.. .the rules on competi-
193. EC TREATY, supra note 19, art. 238.
194. See generally Hungary Interim Agreement, 1992 O.J. (L 116); Poland Interim
Agreement, 1992 O.J. (L 113) 1; Czech Republic Interim Agreement, 1992 O.J. (L 151);
Slovakia Interim Agreement, 1992 O.J. (L 115).
195. A European Community Programme of Policy and Action in Relation to the Envi-
ronment and Sustainable Environment, 1993 O.J. (C 138) 1, 89.
196. PHARE is a French acronym for Poland and Hungary Aid for Economic Recon-
struction. The program extended quickly to all central and east European countries to
assist the economic transition to a free market system. Id.
197. See JULIAN WILSON, PHARE PROGRESS AND STRATEGY PAPER: ENVIRONMENT TO
THE YEAR 2000 (1993).
198. EU: Special Edition; Essen Summit, Euro-East, Dec. 12, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Euro-East File.
199. See Casalino, supra note 26, at 243.
200. Id. at 241.
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tion .... transport, and the environment."20 1
b. White Paper and Agenda 2000
The White Paper set forth the pre-accession strategy for the Asso-
ciated EU Members. 20 2 The primary objective of the White Paper is the
economic "alignment" of the CEECs with the EU Internal Market.
Various legislative descriptions and business conditions in the main
body of the Paper provide the specific strategy for the transition.203 The
Annex addresses other legal sectors, including the environment, in
which the future members will participate. 20 4 In its evaluation of the
White Paper, the Community praised the document because "it provides
a guide to complexities of the Internal Market and suggests a logical
sequence in which the associated countries should bring their legisla-
tion in line with that in the Union,"20 5 explained Commissioner Hans
Van den Broek. On the other hand, some CEECs have criticized the
impracticability of the strategies. For example, Poland's Secretary of
State for European Affairs, Jareck Saryusz-Wolksi, stated the Paper
should be a guide rather than an obstacle requiring high demands for
accession into the EU. 20 6
The Agenda 2000 is the most recent EU expansion plan.20 7 The
Agenda 2000 is a 1,300 page enlargement prospectus drafted by the
European Commission to incorporate ten new CEECs into the EU.208
The negotiations for the first wave of broadening the EU member based
on the Agenda 2000 began in early 1998, with five post-communist
countries; Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Esto-
nia.20 9 A second group identified for future negotiations include Roma-
nia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 210 In total, the Agenda
2000 details the plan to increase the EU's population to 500 million, yet
its GDP would barely grow by 5%.211
In order for the CEECs to qualify for EU membership, the Agenda
primarily requires that the post-communist country transition to a
201. Id.
202. Id. at 243.
203. Id. at 239.
204. Id.
205. Eva Munk, Furthering Integration Goal of EU Assistance, PRAGUE POST, July 12
1995, at A5.
206. EU/East Europe: A White Paper Approved for Nine CEECs, EUROPEAN
INFORMATION SERVICES, June 23, 1995, at 1
207. Jones, supra note 186, at 43.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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functioning democracy and a well-operating competitive economy. 212
The EU expansion requirements also include subscribing to the union's
acquis communautaire, the body of EU law that all members must
adopt.213 Therefore, in some ways, each country's detailed obligations
are unique. Some may include creating or strengthening competition
laws. Others may deal with encouraging innovative, efficient economic
growth through funding business. Yet still others may concern the en-
vironmental standards of operating businesses and the protection of the
environment in general. 214 The five first-tier countries identified by the
Agenda 2000 highlight the ever closer reality of the broadening of the
EU and Brussels willingness to address the problem areas. But at the
same time, even though each CEEC has accomplished tremendous legal
and economic transformation, the prospective EU Member States must
continue to alter their legal, regulatory, and institutional framework
just as the EU does.
2. Example: Poland and the Integration
As a whole, the CEECs' transitions have been generally successful.
Yet each experience is individually unique due to their diverse political,
legal, and cultural backgrounds. 215 Initially, economic restructuring
caused the most difficulty. In particular, each country approached the
creation of a market economy with different strategies of privatization,
business incentive programs, and employment training.2 16 The econo-
mies struggled with growing pains, but recently the CEECs' inflation
stabilized, interest rates rose, and privatized businesses compete more
efficiently in the global market. 217 Despite the slowly stabilizing econ-
omy, the CEECs continue to confront challenges of insufficient financ-
ing, poor monitoring systems, institutional weaknesses, and poorly
trained human resources 218 as they are still learning to adjust.
One of the most unique examples of a CEEC legal transition that
demonstrates the effects of the Cali case issue is the privatization of the
Polish shipping industry. After the fall of communism in 1989, Poland
began to build a free market economy by selling several state-owned en-
terprises to private individuals. This change enabled Poland to create
private businesses, which freely competed in a national market econ-
omy, and eventually in the EU. For example, in the early 1990s, Poland
212. Id. at 44-45.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 45-46.
215. EU/East Europe: EU Focus on Role for Local Government in East Europe,
EUROPEAN INFORMATION SERVICES, Sept. 6, 1995, at 1.
216. Id.
217. EU Enlargement, Business Europe, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Oct. 19,
1998, at 22.
218. See Casalino, supra note 26, at 250-54.
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initiated a privatization plan for its national sea ports, particularly
Gdansk and Gdenia. 21 9 First, the state-owned shipping enterprises of
Gdansk Commercial Sea Port, Gdenia Commercial Sea Port, and Szcze-
cin-Swinoryscie Port Authority were sold to private shareholders as
new joint stock enterprises by late 1991.220 Second, by October 1996,
the joint stock companies structurally reorganized in accordance with
EU competition laws. 221 Third, beginning in November 1996 to the pre-
sent, the companies have operated according to national legislation that
includes environmental standards established by the EU.222 Simply by
examining the general phases of the privatization plan for the Polish
shipping industry, the impact of the Cali is obvious. The integration of
the EU laws creates new standards by which Poland, and other Associ-
ated EU Members must adjust.223 Such alterations of EU law can be
seen as both positive and negative. The integration is a positive benefit
because the CEECs are being held to a higher standard of fair competi-
tion and environmental responsibility which is new to the region and
beneficial to national consumers. 224 In contrast, if the ECJ frequently
interprets the laws in such an arbitrary and unreliable manner, it be-
comes very difficult for the CEECs to formulate laws in their transi-
tioning system that model such legal inconsistencies.225 Although the
integration provides benefits of enlightened EU legal transition, inte-
gration must occur in moderation due to the direct impact beyond its
union members.226
III. DEEPENING LEGAL INTEGRATION IN THE EU
A. European Monetary Union
Competition and environmental laws are not the only issues of le-
gal development exemplifying the EU's enactment of the 1997 Denver
Summit. Although much of academia focuses primarily on the devel-
opment of EU laws broadening the flexibility of the laws in order to ac-
commodate the diverse Member States' legal cultures, the EU's legal
and economic integration, as expressed by the Denver Summit, expands
beyond general widening of the common market eastward. The EU con-
tinues to also deepen the legal integration of its Member States by uni-
219. LEOPOLD KUZMA, Restructuring and Privatizing Poland's Seaports, in SHIPPING
IN THE BALTIC REGION, 89-96 (1997).
220. Id. at 90.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 91.
223. Id.
224. Roger Mastalir, Regulation of Competition in the "New" Free Markets of Eastern
Europe, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 61, 66 (1993).
225. Id.
226. Id.
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formly pulling the nations ever closer through new economic laws.227
The most recent and most important example is the EU executing the
ambitious means of economic integration and monetary reform in the
modern age.228 On January 1, 1999, eleven Member States of the Euro-
pean Union legally merged their currencies, ceding control of their na-
tional monetary policy to the European Central Bank.229 The impact of
the deepening regional integration could hardly be greater, as the EU
leads the world by unifying economic law.230 The new single currency,
the Euro, legally replaces the qualified EU national currencies through-
out the world for business transactions, trading purposes, and currency
reserves.
231
The primary success of the European Monetary Union (EMU) re-
lies, therefore, on the organization of the legal framework. The effects
of the Euro are new and many are still anticipating the full under-
standing and the practical implication of the legal economic frame-
work. 232 However, the following is a preliminary analysis of the deep-
ening regional legal integration through the EMU to demonstrate the
alternative means by which the EU realizes the 1997 Denver Summit
ideals. First the analysis will explain the basic background of legal ref-
ormation for the EMU. Second, the focus will be on the recent integra-
tion and the immediate effects. Finally, the analysis examines the im-
mediate ramifications of the deepening legal integration beyond the
EMU region itself.
1. Development of the European Monetary Union
Similar to the enumeration of the environmental laws, the Maas-
tricht Treaty legislated the details of EU Member States forming the
monetary union by the twenty-first century. 233 In general, the Maas-
tricht Treaty set forth certain economic standards of low inflation and
sound national finances in order to efficiently form a full monetary un-
ion with a single regional monetary policy.234
227. Helen Hartnell, Subregional Coalescence in European Regional Integration, 16
WIS. INT'L L.J. 115, 120 (1997).
228. Road to a Single Currency (last modified January 19, 1999) <http:II
www.cliffordchangce.com/library/pubicationsemulegal/section.html>.
229. Id.
230. Jan Meyers & Damien Levie, Legal Framework: The Introduction of the Euro, 4
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 321 (1998).
231. Id. at 328.
232. Id.
233. Rebecca H. Marek, Continuity of Transatlantic Commercial Contracts After the
Introduction of the Euro, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1990 (1998).
234. See EC TREATY, supra note 19, art. 235; Resolution of the European Council 97/C
236/03, 1997 O.J. (L-615).
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a. Pre-Maastricht Plans
The history of the EMU began long before the Maastricht Treaty
and evolved slowly over several decades. The first plan for the EMU oc-
curred in the 1970 Werner Plan, proposing a single currency by 1980.235
This plan failed because of rapid inflation and turbulent economic con-
ditions caused by the demise of the Bretton Woods system and the in-
ternational oil crisis. 236 The EC persisted with the monetary plans by
creating the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979.237 After a dec-
ade of successfully harmonizing the economic factors of the EC mem-
bers to a narrowing margin under the EMS, 238 another monetary plan
surfaced. The Delors Report of 1989 proposed concrete stages to use in
creating the monetary union.239
b. The Delors Report
The three stages in the Delors Report provided a detailed plan for
the legal and time schedule for the monetary union. The EC eventually
codified these plans in the Maastricht Treaty. 240
Stage one was the preparation for the EMU. This occurred from
January 1, 1990 to December 31, 1993,241 and primarily focused on
eliminating currency controls and dismantling regional restrictions on
capital movements. 242 Pursuant to Council Directive 88/361 of June 24,
1988,243 the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) provided the means of
accomplishing this goal by stabilizing the exchange rate. 244 The EMS
created a system that the Member States' national currency could fluc-
tuate 2.25% higher or lower than the central rate.245 The objective was
to narrow the exchange rate margins of EU Member States and more
closely harmonize their monetary legal systems. To oversee these ob-
235. KENNETH DYSON, ELUSIVE UNION: THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY
UNION IN EUROPE 80-81 (1994).
236. Dyson, supra note 235, at 82-83, 89.
237. Marek, supra note 233, at 1990-91.
238. Patricia Pollard, Economic and Business Decision: The Role of the Euro as an In-
ternational Currency, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 395, 396 (1998) (citing the merging direction of
the economic factors as the snake in a tunnel effect; the economic factors of inflation, defi-
cit, interest rates, and GDP for example fluctuate from high to low in a narrowing effect
as if in a funnel or a squeezing tunnel).
239. Marek, supra note 233, at 1990 (recognizing that Jacques Delors, then President
of the European Commission, wrote the Delors Report).
240. See MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 19, art. 104(c).
241. Meyers & Levie, supra note 230, at 322.
242. Marek, supra note 233, at 1990.
243. Meyers & Levie, supra note 230, at 322.
244. Marek, supra note 233, at 1991.
245. Pollard, supra note 238, at 397-99 (discussing the detailed economic regulations
for each economic factor the EU sought to harmonize as a solid foundation for the EMU
during stage one).
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jectives, the EMS also established the central bank governors, who for-
mulated basic regional economic policy and a common centralized
banking structure.
Stage two enacted the monetary convergence from January 1, 1994,
to December 31, 1997. The second stage required more specific eco-
nomic integration factors to be met by each prospective EMU State.
Examples of these factors include the interest rate, price and currency
stability, and size of the government deficit. The criteria ensured that
the EMU Member States attained "sustainable financial positions" to
create a solid foundation for stage three of the union. In addition, Arti-
cle 109(e) of the Maastricht Treaty outlined the European Monetary In-
stitution (EMI) in Frankfurt to replace the central bank governors of
the previous stage. The EMI established the formal mechanism to co-
ordinate the EU monetary policy. The policy includes the ECU, a re-
gional basket of currencies to facilitate the currency merger. The ECU
created a healthy means to stable economies and to unionize the cur-
rencies smoothly.
B. European Monetary Union Integration
Stage three of the Delors Report legally enacted the EMU. On
January 1, 1999, eleven qualified countries irrevocably fixed their cur-
rencies to the Euro and volunteered their fiscal policy and national
banks to the European Central Bank via the form of the European Sys-
tem of Central Banks (ESCB). This, however, was only one of three im-
portant events for stage three integration. Prior to the countries' fixing
their respective currencies to the Euro, on May 3, 1998, the Council of
Ministers formally selected the eligible EMU Member States based on
the national financial status of each. The decision naming the Member
States qualified for the single currency followed a Council vote, based
on European Commission and EMI reports submitted in March 1998,
and an opinion by the European Parliament. The Council decided that
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain fulfilled the necessary economic con-
ditions. Greece clearly did not satisfy the requirements; Sweden failed
to meet the Exchange Rate Mechanism membership and still main-
tained an independent central bank; and Denmark and the United
Kingdom both exercised the "opt-out" clause in the 1999 integration. 246
Thus, on January 1, 1999, the currencies of the participating first wave
Member States ceased to exist, and monetary history was made. 247 Le-
gally, the Euro replaces all "paperless" money forms of the participating
246. The initial choice of EU members to opt out does not prohibit them from joining
the EMU at a later date. See MAASTRICHT Treaty, supra note 19, arts. 1091(1)-(2), 109j
(4).
247. See generally Road to a Single Currency, supra note 228.
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countries on a 1:1 basis. 248 Finally, the third important date is January
1, 2002, when the Euro banknotes and coins will be tendered. 249 This
day is dubbed the E-day, when the Euro will be the only legal currency
for the EMU.250 By the end of June, 2002, all national currencies will
cease to be legal tender. 251
Timetable: Key Elements of the EMU Integration
March 1998 Commission and EMI produced reports on Member State
compliance with
Maastricht criteria
May 1998 Participating Member States chosen
Announcement of bilateral conversion rates
between participating currencies
Article 1091(4) Regulation adopted
June 1998 European Central Bank established
Dec. 31, 1998 Conversion Weekend
to Re-denomination of domestic government debt of partici-
January 3, 1999 pating Member States
Stock exchanges of participating Member States move to
Euro
ICSDs move to Euro operations
January 1, 1999 Launch of single currency and start of transitional period:
Irrevocable locking of conversion rates
Euro becomes currency of participating Member States
National currency units become denominations of the
Euro
ECU obligations converted into Euro obligations at 1:1
conversion rate
European Central Bank takes over control of monetary
policy for Euro zone
New issues of government debt issued in Euro
248. See Council Resolution 97/C 236/03-04 and 981133fEC 1999 O.J. (L-615)
249. Id.
250. Meyers & Levie, supra note 230, at 327.
251. Id.
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Dec. 31, 2001 End of transitional period
Obligations denominated in national currency units re-
denominated into Euro
January 1, 2002 Euro banknotes and coins introduced
3June 0, 2002 Latest date on which national banknotes and coins cease
to be legal tender
C. Impact of the EMU on EU Expansion
The European Monetary Union plan is a very ambitious and far-
reaching legal reform for the EU's economy.252 Europe has formed the
world's largest trading block with a single currency since the collapse of
the Roman Empire. In terms of sheer size, the EMU encompasses a
population of 290 million people, a population greater than the United
States.253 In terms of economic performance, the EMU only narrowly
trails the first place gross domestic product of the United State. 254
Based on these statistics and the anticipated impact of the new cur-
rency, central banks around the world have already switched large por-
tions of their foreign exchange reserves from the US dollar to the Euro,
completing the biggest financial asset movement in history.25 5 Fur-
thermore, the introduction of the Euro impacts all aspects of the EMU
Member States international interaction.
An example of this impact may be seen in the European Council's
Regulation 1103/97.256 In preparation for the monetary conversion, the
Regulation established the principle of continuity of contract. Specifi-
cally, this principle provides that the change of the European currencies
will not invalidate any contractual obligation.25 7 It also defines the con-
version procedures and rounding valuation rules. Although such regu-
lations have direct force of law only in the EMU, the EU legislated laws
252. Id. at 323.
253. Anthony Browne, Birth of the Euro: Dollar Trembles as a Giant Awakes, THE
OBSERVER, Jan. 3, 1999, at 6.
254. Id.
255. Id (stating that the asset switch from dollar to Euro is estimated to reach $1,000
billion worth of assets).
256. See Council Regulation 1103/97 of June 17, 1997 on Certain Provisions Relating
to the Introduction of the Euro, 1997 O.J. (L162) 1. Additional legislation includes Regu-
lation 1091(4) which states, "the introduction of the euro shall not have the effect of al-
tering any term of a legal instrument or of discharging or excusing performance under
any legal instrument, nor give a party the right unilaterally to alter or terminate such an
instrument." Resolution of the European Council of July 7, 1997 on the Legal Framework
for the Introduction of the Euro, 1997 O.J. (C 236) 7.
257. See generally Council Regulation 1103/97, supra note 256.
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for the entire union to ensure credibility of the new currency. 258 For
example, Regulation 235, based upon Article 235 of the EC Treaty, ap-
plies to the entire EU regardless of the State's participation in stage
three. Another unusual legal feature is that the national currencies in-
volved will not disappear immediately. 259 This allows society to pro-
gressively adjust to the new legal currency and familiarize itself with
the novel market prices. 260 Accounting, tax, and securities concerns
have been additional areas of law that the EU has drafted new direc-
tives to harmonize. 26' Overall, while the legal infrastructure is in posi-
tion, the long-term ramifications and application of the legal framework
remains to be seen. In the short-term, however, the immediate eco-
nomic and legal results appear to be positive for the EMU.262
In light of the new predominant currency in the world financial
market, many EU banks, such as ABN AMRO Bank of Netherlands are
merging and acquiring other financial institutions to expand their
service networks across the world. 263 Again, the EU legal integration
affects nations beyond only the eligible EMU Member States, and even
beyond the EU Member States. The Central and East European Coun-
tries have been the most directly affected by the deepening EU legal re-
form. 264 For example ABN AMRO's most recent acquisition was the
Magyar Hitel Bank in Hungary. This merger created the fourth largest
bank in Europe and the eighth largest in the world. 265
In general, Hungary, along with Poland and Slovenia were the first
countries to publicly acknowledge their national enthusiasm for the
Euro after its birth.266 For these CEECs, the post-Euro benefits include
increased foreign investment and booming economies for emerging and
converging markets. 267 Within only a few weeks of life, the CEECs
quickly realized that the Euro is more than simply a single legal cur-
258. Meyers & Levie, supra note 230, at 328 (describing a detailed analysis of the rule
of Continuity of Contract and its purpose); see also Elke Theil, Political Implications: The
Euro: Should the US Worry?, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 447 (1998).
259. Regulation 109 (4), supra note 249, art. 6(1).
260. Meyers & Levie, supra note 230, at 335.
261. See Corn (97) 491, II503/97-EN-3, European Commission Directorate General XV,
(last modified Jan. 3, 1997) <http:/leuropa.eu.intlen/comm/dgl5/ dgl5home.html>.
262. ABN AMBRO Marches Ahead in New Euro-led Financial Environment, THE
KOREAN HERALD, Jan. 14, 1999, Asia Intelligence Wire, available in LEXIS, News library;
David Kern, International Outlook, NAT'L WESTMINSTER BANK ECON. & FIN. OUTLOOK,
January 1999, at 2.
263. See ABN, supra note 262.
264. Alan Beattie, Calmer Markets Ponder Real's Future, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1999, at
31.
265. See ABN, supra note 262.
266. Budapest Tastes Sweet Success: Emerging Market Focus, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan.
12, 1999, at 42.
267. Hungary Attracts Foreign Interests, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1999, at 21; Budapest,
supra note 266, at 42.
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rency for eligible EMU States. Many CEECs have pegged their curren-
cies to the Euro directly, due to the increase in international financial
activity. 268 In summary, the Euro presents an alternative way of
thinking about regional economic legal integration.269
As several CEECs strive to join the EU, the EU has required its
eastern neighbors to harmonize their legal system and legislation to be
compatible with the EU. Countries such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Slovenia and Estonia 270 are now actively reforming laws such
as banking structure and monetary laws. 271 Additionally, the CEECs
are required to reach specific standards of economic performance as
preconditions to their entry into the EU.272 The economic factors that
have proven to be the most troubling for the CEEC include low inflation
rates and higher gross domestic products. Nonetheless, Associated EU
Members continuously strive to mirror even the deepening integration
of the EMU legal system and move ever closer to full EU member-
ship.273
IV. CONCLUSION
The European Union poignantly demonstrates the reality of several
successful and persistent steps towards the 1997 Denver Summit of
Eight's objective to promote global integration. Just as the leaders of
the Twenty-Third Annual Summit discussed, the European Union con-
tinues to enact the necessary steps, both domestically and internation-
ally "to shape the forces of integration to ensure prosperity and peace
for our citizens and the entire world as we approach the twenty-first
century."274 The European Union has taken bold steps to both broaden
and deepen its legal system to accomplish the ideal international inte-
gration. Competition and environmental laws reflect the EU's willing-
ness to expand the application of its laws in order to more flexibly and
realistically accommodate the diverse sovereign Member States. The
268. Pollard, supra note 238, at 449.
269. Hartnell, supra note 227, at 120.
270. Agenda 2000 identified these five CEECs as the first tier of potential EU mem-
bers. The EU selected these countries because of their relatively strong market econo-
mies and rapid legal transformation. The EU also identified a second and third tiers that
include Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Georgia, Dazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania,
Russia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia (containing Serbia and Montenegro).
271. Hartnell, supra note 227, at 126-27.
272. See Jones, supra note 207, at 45.
273. See The EU Budget: Just Small Change?, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 1999, at 21;
see also Unfinished Business: Poland Prepares for Europe, THE ECONOMIST, January 19,
1999, at 37.
274. Final Communiqu6, supra note 1, at Introduction.
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European Monetary Union exemplifies important steps for the EU to
integrate its economy more extensively in order to strengthen the pros-
perity of the Member States. However, both the broadening and deep-
ening legal integration create implications expanding well beyond the
EU itself. The case study of the EU legal modifications offers an oppor-
tunity to thoroughly understand and appreciate the dynamic impor-
tance of EU law in the world. The dual style EU integration demon-
strates the logical evolution of law as the EU strives to effectuate the
ideals of global harmony as presented in the 1997 Denver Summit of
Eight.

